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HEGEMONY, COERCION, AND THEIR TEETH-GRITTING
HARMONY: A COMMENTARY ON POWER, CULTURE, AND
SEXUALITY IN FRANCO'S SPAIN
Ratna Kapur*
Tayyab Mahmud**
Professor Gema P~rez-Sdinchez's article, Franco's Spain, Queer Na-
tion?' focuses on the last years of Francisco Franco's fascist
dictatorship and the early years of the young Spanish democracy,
roughly from the late 1960's to the early 1980's.' The centerpiece
of her article looks at how, through law, Franco's regime sought to
define and contain what it considered dangerous social behavior,
particularly homosexuality. She traces how the state not only exer-
cised hegemonic control over definitions of gender and sexuality,
but also established well-defined roles for women and drew clear
lines between what constituted legitimate and illegitimate sexuali-
ties, namely, the line between heterosexuality and homosexuality.
She discusses how non-hegemonic sexual minorities subverted this
line of control, especially during the 1970's, when they mobilized
3
and resisted the law against socially dangerous behavior. The pe-
riod that followed this resistance witnessed the gradual transition
to democracy in Spain and a heyday of gay cultural and literary
activism. 4 Professor P~rez-S~inchez's bold and innovative legal
scholarship, exploring the relationships between law, literature,
and politics, is a good representation of the critical project in legal
scholarship that aims to uncover the role of law in the intersec-
tions of power and resistance.
* Director, Centre for Feminist Legal Research, New Delhi. B.A., University of
Delhi; B.A., M.A. (Law), Cambridge University; LL. M., Harvard Law School.
** Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
B.A. 1973, University of Punjab; M.Sc. 1975, University of Islamabad; Ph.D. 1981, University
of Hawaii;J.D., 1987, University of California, Hastings College of Law.
1. Gema P6rez-Sinchez, Franco's Spain, Queer Nation?, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 943
(2000), 33 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM 359 (2000).
2. See generally id.
3. See id. at 5 MIcH.J. RAcE & L. at 956-59, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 372-75.
4. See id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 970-85, 330 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 386-401.
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I. THEORIES OF STATE AND LOCATIONS OF POWER
In the first part of her article, Professor P~rez-Sdinchez examines
the ways in which power is understood and used by a fascist state in
contrast with one that has transitioned into democracy. She re-
views Althusser's notion of the modern state, where a distinction is
made between state power and apparatus, the apparatus behaving
much as a catalyst and remaining unaffected even when state
power is seized and altered.' A comparative example would be the
post-colonial states of South Asia, where the apparatuses of the
state, in particular its laws and bureaucracy, remained largely unaf-
fected through the transition to self-rule.6 As a result, colonial
forms and practices remain alive in and through the state appara-
tuses even after formal independence.
In his analysis of the state, Althusser draws a distinction between
the repressive state and the ideological state apparatuses. The
former includes the army, police, judiciary, and the penal system.
The latter includes education, religion, family, political parties,
communications, and cultural systems. This is a crucial distinction,
which enables conservative, even fascistic forces, to continue to
advance their agendas in formally liberal democratic settings. The
Christian Coalition in the United States, the Hindu Right in India,
and the Islamic reaction in Pakistan are different examples of the
way in which ideological state apparatuses can and are being used
and used effectively in pursuit of hegemonic and anti-minority
agendas within the framework of liberal democracy.
8
Professor Pdrez-Sdinchez critiques what she characterizes as the
monolithic understanding of state power that informs Althusser's
theory. 9 She adopts instead Foucault's position that relations of
power "are not univocal; they define innumerable points of con-
5. See id. at 5 MIcH.J. RACE & L. at 945-47, 330 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 361-63.
6. See generally AYESHAJALAL, DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM IN SOUTH ASIA: A
COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1995); Tayyab Mahmud, Preatorianism and
Common Law in Post-Colonial Seetings: Judicial Responses to Constitutional Breakdowns in Pakistan,
1993 UTAH L. REV. 1225.
7. See Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Inves-
tigation), in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 121, 141 (Ben Brewster trans.,
Monthly Rev. Press, 1971).
8. See, e.g., BRENDA COSSMAN & RATNA KAPUR, SECULARISM'S LAST SIGH? HINDUTVA
AND THE (MIs)RULE OF LAW (1999); Tayyab Mahmud, Freedom of Religion and Religious Mi-
norities: A Study ofJudicial Practice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 40 (1995).
9. See P4rez-Sknchez, supra note 1, at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 946 n.7, 33 U. MICH.J.L.
REFORM at 362 n.7.
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frontation, focuses of instability, each of which has its own risks of
conflict, of struggles, and of an at least temporary inversion of the
power relations."' ° By way of example, Professor P6rez-Sdinchez
points out how the repressive mechanisms of Franco's rule, namely
the police and the law, met the issue of homosexuality with cul-
tural resistance. The repressive law dealing with socially dangerous
behavior, directed primarily against homosexuals and enacted dur-
ing Franco's rule, provoked a resistance that led to the ultimate
demise of the law and witnessed a post-modern cultural explo-
sion." This cultural movement secured sexuality, more specifically,
sexual difference, as an example of what could be regarded as a
political issue.
The article aims to disengage from "an over-simplified view of
state power as exclusively producing repressive effects."12 Impor-
tant theoretical interventions that enable innovative thinking
about the state implicitly inform her article. Professor P6rez-
Sdinchez refers to Althusser's idea of a "teeth-gritting harmony"1
3
between coercive and ideological apparatuses, between law and
culture, between Gramsci's conception of hegemony and Fou-
cault's notion of diffuse and unstable operations of power. Picking
up her thread, we believe an exploration into the substance of re-
pression, state power, and social orders, imagined as a "teeth-
gritting harmony," is warranted. In this Commentary we focus on
these interrelationships in order to obtain a sharper picture of how
power functions in modern societies. We aim squarely at the ques-
tion fundamental to Professor P6rez-Sdinchez's project, namely the
role of law in the incessant struggle between power and resistance.
Professor P6rez-Sdinchez takes the position that Althusser's the-
ory of the state "conceives power as monolithic," because even
though ideological apparatuses are presumed to be diverse they
have a shared role in "the reproduction of the relations of produc-
tion." 14 While the term "relations of production" has a particular
paradigmatic lineage currently out of academic favor, most social
theorists would agree that the primary role of the dominant
10. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 27 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1978). See P~rez-Sinchez, supra note 1, at 5
MICH.J. RACE & L. at 946 n.7, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 362 n.7.
11. See Perez-Snchez, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 954-58, 970; 33 U.
MICH.J.L. REFORM at 370-74, 386.
12. Id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 945, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 361.
13. Althusser, supra note 7, at 150. See Prez-Sfnchez, supra note 1, at 5 MICH.J. RACE
& L. at 946 n.7, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 362 n.7.
14. Prez-SAnchez, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 946 n.7, 33 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM at 362 n.7.
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coercive and ideological practices in any social structure is to per-
petuate that structure. This assertion does not, in and of itself,
render Althusser's theory of power monolithic. His most important
contribution to social theory was his refutation that institutions are
autonomous from state and cultural practice. 15 By seeing coercion
and ideology along the same continuum rather than as completely
separate practices, Althusser opened the door for post-structuralist
views about operations of power. Thus, Althusser and Foucault
may not be so far apart as Professor Prez-Sinchez's brief com-
ments may suggest.
Nicos Poulantzas attempts to reconcile Althusser and Foucault,
and his work aids greatly in appreciating how the two theorists
complement one another. 6 In order to clarify the issue, we must
first briefly sketch the theories of Gramsci, Althusser, and Foucault
as they relate to Professor P6rez-Sdinchez's project. We focus here
on the relationship between coercion and ideology and the de-
marcation between the public and the private. Here the notion of
hegemony, as used by Gramsci, furnishes the point of departure.
Gramsci, rather than identify the state with government or with the
repressive-coercive apparatus, forwards a broader notion of the
state so that it includes "the state proper and civil society ... the
entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which
the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its domination, but
manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules."'
17
The concept of the state here assumes a "wider and more organic
sense, including elements which need to be referred back to the
notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that state =
political + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the
armour of coercion.)"' The very notion of the state is modified by
Gramsci to include the entire complex of institutions and practices
through which power relations are mediated in a social formation
to ensure the "political and cultural hegemony of a social group
15. For a succinct assessment of Althusser's work, see Norman Geras, Althusser's Marx-
ism: An Assessment, in WESTERN MARXISM: A CRITICAL READER 232 (New Left Review ed.,
1978).
16. See Nicos POULANTZAS, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM (Patrick Camiller trans., 1979).
For the cordial personal relationship between Althusser and Foucault, see Louis
ALTHUSSER, THE FUTURE LASTS A LONG TIME 271-73 (Richard Veasy trans., Olivier Corpet
& Yann Moulier Boutang eds., 1993).
17. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO
GRAMSCI 244 (Hoare and Nowell Smith eds., 1971).
18. Id. at 263.
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over the entire society, as the ethical content of the state."' 9 The
most striking aspect of Gramsci's formulation is his abolition of a
strict distinction between state and civil society. According to him,
"by 'State' should be understood not only the apparatus of gov-
ernment, but also the'private' apparatus of 'hegemony' or civil
society. '20 For Gramsci, ideas and values do not simply justify an
existing power structure. Ideas and values are also formative forces
capable of disrupting and redistributing power itself. In this sense,
civil society is the quintessential ideological realm and thus is po-
tentially the source of either hegemonic or counter-hegemonic
ideas. The public/private contradiction dissolves and civil society is
primarily defined by how it is structured.
As Professor P~rez-Sdinchez's project focuses on Spain between
1960 and 1980, it is very important to note that Gramsci recog-
nized that his notion of civil society is limited to contexts where
capitalism and a liberal legal order had opportunity to take root.
In Czarist Russia, for example, he noted that "the State was every-
thing, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West,
there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and
when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at
once revealed., 2' Gramsci's analysis of the relative underdevelop-
ment of the southern region of Italy as compared to the state as a
whole demonstrated that even within a single state, unequal devel-
opment of productive forces and attendant relations might effect
the viability of a civil society."
Althusser carried Gramsci's notions of hegemony and the fusion
of state and civil society into an analysis of concrete practices of
ideological institutions, yielding the concept of ideological state
apparatuses. In defining such apparatuses as the church, the
school, the family, and so forth, Althusser notes that whereas the
coercive state apparatuses belong to the public domain, the ideologi-
cal state apparatuses thrive in the private domain. The distinction
between public and private is unimportant, as he contends that:
the State, which is the State of the ruling class, is neither pub-
lic nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition for any
19. John Merrington, Theory and Practice in Gramsci's Marxism, in WESTERN MARXISM: A
CRITICAL READER 140, 151 (New Left Rev. ed., 1977) (quoting Antonio Gramsci, Passato e
Presente 164-65 (1975)).
20. GRAMsci, supra note 17, at 261.
21. Id. at 238.
22. See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, THE SOUTHERN QUESTION (Pasquale Vericchio trans., ed.,
1995).
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distinction between public and private .... It is unimportant
whether the institutions in which they [ideological state appa-
ratuses] are realized are 'public" or 'private.' What matters is
how they function. 3
The difference between coercive and ideological apparatuses,
according to Althusser, is that every state apparatus functions both
by repression and by ideology, the difference being that the re-
pressive state apparatus functions predominantly by repression,
whereas the ideological state apparatuses function predominantly
by ideology.
24
The important thing to note in the formulations of Gramsci and
Althusser is that hegemony is not taken as something that comes
about merely as a mechanical derivative of economic predomi-
nance of ruling classes. Rather, it is posited as work, resulting from
permanent and pervasive efforts of the dominant classes, secured
through their control of the state, to create solidarity among the
powerful and supra-party consensus. Viewed in this light one can
see important threads that run from Gramsci to Althusser to Fou-
cault.
Foucault carries forward Gramsci's model of seeing the state as
constituted by both the political and civil society, and argues that
we can make no analytical distinction between the state and civil
society. For him, "relations of power are not in a position of exte-
riority with respect to other types of relations (economic processes,
knowledge relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent to
the latter ... [and] they have a directly productive role, whenever
they come into play."25 Institutions beyond the juridical state create
the model for the disciplinary use of power in modern societies,
which aim to and do yield normalized subjects and thus exert he-
gemony. In the modern disciplinary society the lines of power
extend throughout social spaces in the channels created by institu-
tions traditionally located in the civil society. The exertion of
power is organized through deployments, which are simultane-
ously ideological, institutional, and corporeal. The argument is not
that there is no state, but rather that it cannot effectively be iso-
lated and contested at a level separate from society. The state is not
properly understood as the transcendent source of power relations
23. Althusser, supra note 7, at 149.
24. See id. at 138.
25. MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 94 (1978).
1000 [VOL. 5:995
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in society, but as the consolidation of forces of "statization" exist-
ing within social power relations. 6
In the final analysis, however, for Foucault it is the nature of
power, equally dispersed and localized, that is important in the
study of everyday practices. Even when these different sites of
power come together in a global strategy of domination, the links
between these sites remain incoherent, disconnected, unstable,
and discontinuous. Foucault therefore denied any general pattern
of domination, coherence of macro-structures of power, presence
of an ultimate cause of power, or any static binary encompassing
opposition between the rulers and the ruled. v In his determina-
tion to shift the terms of discourse away from the state to micro
sites of power, Foucault denied to the state blanket mastery of the
discourse of power.2 s
Foucault extended the analysis of power equations that were
traditionally thought of as belonging to the state and its institu-
tions to cover all locations of social interaction. 9 Rejecting a top-
down analysis of power beginning with the state, sovereignty, and
law, he adopts an ascending analysis of power. The state emerges
in his formulation as built on the power relations already present
in society. The state is in a manner of speaking secondary to these
sites of power. Directing attention away from visible and formal-
ized codes of power, Foucault concentrates on the way in which
individuals experience power at all sites of human relations. He
focuses on the way in which the individual is constituted by these
relations, the micro-physics of power, and the forms it acquires in
specific contexts, the articulation of that power through dis-
courses, and the fact that power is ubiquitous, immanent, and lacks
both a beginning and an end. Foucault asserts that:
What we need, however, is a political philosophy that isn't
erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore the
problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the
kings' head, in political theory that still has to be done .... To
pose the problem in terms of the state means to continue
26. See GILLES DELUEZE, FOUCAULT 84 (1986).
27. See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN Gov-
ERNMENTALITY (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
28. AsJessop puts it: "Foucault faced difficulties in moving from the amorphous dis-
persion of micro-powers to their class-relevant overdetermination in and through the
central role of the state." B. JESSOP, STATE THEORY: PUTTING CAPITALIST STATES IN THEIR
PLACE 238 (1990).
29. Seegenerally Foucault, supra note 27.
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posing it in terms of sovereignty and sovereignty, that is to
say, in terms of law. If one describes all these phenomena of
power as dependent on the state apart, this means grasping
them as essentially repressive."
Foucault, however, accepts that linkages between power rela-
tions are consolidated into a global strategy of bourgeois
domination, and that this crystallizes in the state.3'
It is essential for Professor P~rez-Sinchez's project that, in light
of Gramsci, Althusser, and Foucault, any fundamental distinction
between coercive and ideological apparatuses be rejected. This can
be imagined as a rejection of any fundamental division between
mind and body. If the state is inherently a relationship of domina-
tion and coercion, the notion of coercion implies violence
exercised on living human beings. But as humans are not simply
non-conscious biological entities, domination requires more than
physical violence to the flesh. Domination must extend to a proc-
ess of subjugation. The practice of rendering the normal goes
beyond the mind/body and material/ideological distinctions be-
cause social order makes demands on human action, not simply on
human act.32 A graphic description by Foucault helps us appreciate
this process:
[T] he body is also directly involved in a political field; power
relations have immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it,
train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform cere-
monies, to emit signs. The political investment of the body is
30. Foucault explains his position:
I don't want to say that the state isn't important, what I want to say is that relations of
power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extends be-
yond the limits of the state. In two senses: first of all because the state, for all the
omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of
actual power relations, and further because the state can only operate on the basis of
other, already existing power relations.... This meta power with its prohibitions can
only take hold and secure its footing where it is rooted in a whole series of multiple
and infinite power relations that supply the necessary basis for the great negative
forms of power.
Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, in THE FOUCAULT READER 63 (P. Rabinow ed., 1987).
31. See id. at 64.
32. While "act" refers simply to observable behavior, "action" refers to the "act" nes-
tled in the meaning and purposefulness attached to it by the actor. For a discussion of the
distinction between "act," "behavior," and "action," see RICHARD BERNSTEIN, PRAxis AND
ACTION (1971); Tayyab Mahmud, Epistemology of Social Inquiry: A Contribution to the Critique of
Logical Positivism / Empiricism, 5 SCRUTINY 29 (1980).
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bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations,
with its economic uses; it is largely as a force of production
that the body is invested with relations of power and domina-
tion; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labor power is
possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection (in
which need is also a political instrument meticulously pre-
pared, calculated and used); the body becomes a useful force
only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body.33
The interplay of coercion and ideology, and of force and per-
suasion, is the vital insight that the works of Gramsci, Althusser,
and Foucault introduced into social theory. One could summarize
this insight by saying that ideology is the velvet glove that encases
the iron fist of coercion. This perspective opens a unique vantage
point to the study of law, in particular, as law always combines co-
ercion and ideology by its very structure and operation. And it is in
this sense that Professor Pdrez-Sinchez's article is a very welcome
contribution-not only in advancing the project of multi-
disciplinary research about the law, but more specifically to see
how far-flung structures form one another.
One other line of inquiry that links Althusser and Foucault may
be fruitful to Professor Pdrez-Sinchez's project. We refer here to
Althusser's doctrine of interpellation and Foucault's concept of
governmentality. Althusser's understanding of interpellation stages
a social scene in which the subject is hailed by an officer of the law,
the subject turns around, and in this turning the subject accepts
the terms by which she is hailed. This turning around, as Judith
Butler explains, "is an act that is, as it were, conditioned both by
the 'voice' of the law and by the responsiveness of the one hailed
by the law. The 'turning around' is a strange sort of middle
ground.., which is determined both by the law and the addressee,
but by neither unilaterally or exhaustively. 3 4 This idea suggests a
terrain beyond the coercion/ideology overlap, where determining
whether subjection is complete requires accounting for the ad-
dressee's willingness to be subjected: while "there would be no
turning around without first having been hailed, neither would
there be a turning around without some readiness to turn.
' '
5
33. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 25-26
(1979).
34. JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION 107
(1997).
35. Id.
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Foucault's notion of governmentality as a new method of power
is concerned with the ordering and management of whole popula-
tions.3' But the managing of a population does not apply only to
the collective mass of phenomena and aggregate effects, but also
the management of people in depth and detail. Foucault was trou-
bled by the trend in modern governance toward impossible forms
of political sovereignty whereby government is of all and of each,
whereby the goal is both to conglomerate and to individualize.
Foucault argues that for "modern political rationality" there is an
integral relation between "the reinforcement of. .. [the political]
totality" and "increasing individualization." Here the individual
increasingly comes to be self-determining, but in a context that she
is supposed to monitor and discipline hersef.37 The willingness of
Althusser's subject to turn when hailed and the self-discipline of
Foucault's subject both raise interesting lines of inquiry for proj-
ects like Professor P6rez-Sinchez's. To what extent is the
homosexual or any other sexual subject itself an effect of power
relations? To what extent is subjectification as a homosexual or any
other sexual subject partly contingent on the subject's willingness
to be part of the process? To what extent is she implicated in her
own subjection to technologies of power?
A word of caution is warranted, however, when one deploys so-
cial theory born in Europe's northern heartland, i.e., Britain,
France, and Germany, to study social formations located outside it.
While claiming universal application, Eurocentric social theory is
often conditioned by the specifics of its spatial and temporal ori-
gin. Social formations whose reception of modernity are not the
same as that of the North European heartland may well be inap-
propriate sites for application of North European theory. When we
36. The concept of governmentality, which he uses interchangeably with governmen-
tal rationality and the art of government, emerges from Foucault's interest in seeing
government as an activity or practice, rather than as an institution having some essential
purpose. For Foucault, government may be defined as "the conduct of conduct:" a form of
activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons. This activity
operates through certain techniques of power, or power/knowledge, designed to observe,
monitor, shape, and control the behavior of individuals situated within a range of social and
economic institutions. For Foucault, this does not mean that power has an almost absolute
capability to tame and subject individuals. In his model, power is only power, in distinction
from physical force or violence, when addressed to individuals who retain some freedom of
action. Power, for him, is "action on others' actions": it presupposes rather than annuls
their capacity as agents. See Focault, supra note 27; Colin Gordon, Governmental Rationality:
An Introduction, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT, supra note 27; Colin Gordon, Afterword, in
MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 245 (1980).
37. Seegenerally PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 118-41 (1992)
(explaining Foucault's theories of disciplinary power and self-sufficient subjectivity).
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do not heed this we wittingly or unwittingly adopt a unilinear evo-
lutionist perspective whereby a historical process unfolding under
concrete conditions-Seventeenth to Twentieth century Northern
Europe-is presented as a universal path that all subsequent social
developments are fated to tread. The outcome is history by analogy
rather than history as process. This imperialism of categories
born of "final vocabularies"" and grand narratives of modernity
ensures that particular reality has meaning only to the extent that
it can be seen to reflect a particular stage of development of the
history of Northern Europe. Northern Europe's experience of
modernity is taken as universal history, and it is assumed that "it is
only the concepts of European social philosophy that contain
within them the possibility of universalization." 9 Ignoring differ-
ences within Europe, Eurocentricism presents European historical
experience in an idealized, mythologised, and non-contradictory
form. European social theory is taken too literally, as a description
of European history rather than as a prescription for its develop-
ment. Just as it holds up modem North European history as a mirror
in which to gauge the significance of all human development,
Eurocentricism also has a tendency to view its objects as lacking in
the capacity to comprehend their own history as a step toward the
initiative to (re)making it.
Let us reconsider the three theorists we embraced above in this
cautionary light. As previously mentioned, Gramsci himself limited
existence of civil society to formations where capitalism and a lib-
eral legal order were entrenched. He explicitly excluded Czarist
Russia and Southern Italy from application of histheory. Althusser
has been criticized for being too preoccupied with theoretical bat-
tles within Western Marxism and for taking the history of the
Catholic Church in France as prototypical of all social formations.0
Much of Foucault's work is often faulted for being imprisoned in
the history of modern France and for marginalizing the colonial
38. HoMI BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 125 (1994) (discussing the imperialis-
tic nature of colonial languages). This refers to the imprisonment of modern thought in
ontological and epistemological conceptual categories born in post-Enlightment Europe.
Examples include the modern categories of universality, history, man, reason, nation, and
rights. See DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND
HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE (2000).
39. Partha Chatterjee, A Response to Taylor's "Modes of Civil Society," 3 PUBLIC CULTURE
119 (1990).
40. See, e.g., Mladen Dolar, Beyond Interpellation, 6 QuI PARLE 75 (1993); JUDITH BUT-
LER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION 106-31 (1997).
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question.4 ' Any uncritical adoption of the Gramscian concept of
hegemony has been abundantly refuted by studies of colonialism,
which find that while "the metropolitan state was hegemonic in
character with its claim of dominance based on a power relation in
which the moment of persuasion outweighed that of coercion ...
the colonial state was non-hegemonic with persuasion outweighed
by coercion in its structure of domination."4 2 This, in turn, has a
direct bearing on the relationship between law and both the state
and the social formation at large. In the colony "law was a depart-
ment of the executive, never achieving the autonomy envisaged
by liberal designs of governance. Given its relatively backward
economy combined with a fascist political order, Spain may well
have been closer to a colonized formation than a metropolitan
one. The role of the Catholic Church in Franco's Spain further
bolsters this argument. Althusser takes the position, for example,
that whereas the dominant ideological state apparatus in the pre-
capitalist period was the church, "the ideological State apparatus
which has been installed in the dominant position in mature capital-
ist social formation... is the educational ideological apparatus.""
4
Professor P~rez-Sinchez affirms the dominant ideological position
of the Catholic Church in Franco's Spain and that it was used as an
effective institutional means to "rectify the moral trajectory of the
country."45 All of this suggests that when we are analyzing social
phenomena in settings other than Northern Europe it may be use-
ful to seek theoretical guidance from Europe's Others; fortunately
there is no dearth of such guidance now. 6 In the case of fascist
rule in Spain, a focus of Professor Prez-Sfinchez, particularly use-
ful are studies that recognize the particularity of this phenomenon,
41. See, e.g, ANN LAURA STOLER, RACE AND THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE: FOUCAULT'S
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY AND THE COLONIAL ORDER OF THINGS (1995).
42. RANAJIT GUHA, DOMINANCE WITHOUT HEGEMONY: HISTORY AND POWER IN CO-
LONIAL INDIA Xii (1997).
43. David A. Washbrook, Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India, 15 MODERN
ASIAN STUDIES 649, 714 (1981).
44. Althusser, supra note 7, at 152.
45. P6rez-Sdnchez, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 953, 33 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM at 369 (internal quotation omitted).
46. See, e.g., GUHA, supra note 45; MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CON-
TEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (1997); MAHMOOD MAMDANI,
IMPERIALISM AND FASCISM IN UGANDA (1984); SAMIR AMIN, IMPERIALISM AND UNEQUAL
DEVELOPMENT (1978); ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, DEPENDENT ACCUMULATION AND UNDERDE-
VELOPMENT (1978); PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970); THE POST-
DEVELOPMENT READER (Majid Rahnema & Victoria Bawtree eds., 1997).
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both with regard to its historical lineage and its disjunction from
contemporaneous Europe.
II. A QUEER LAW IN FRANCO'S SPAIN
Armed with a nuanced theory of the state, Professor P6rez-
Sdinchez proceeds to examine the historical context in which laws
regulating homosexuality were implemented. She argues that
throughout the period of Franco's rule, Spain occupied a very
marginalized position in relation to other European democracies,
except during the brief period in the 1960's, and that this accounts
for the adoption of an autarchic economic system. 8
Professor P6rez-Sdinchez's claim that fascist Spain was
"ostracized" by the West is well founded. The trajectory of this os-
tracization was incomplete, however. While Spain was excluded
from the largess of the Marshall Plan, the onset of the Cold War
led the United States to cement security relationships with Western
European nations with varied political systems. Suddenly, the only
criterion a state faced for inclusion was its willingness to play the
containment of communism game. Turkey, Greece, Portugal, and
Spain, along with "Western democracies," were quickly incorpo-
rated into the American strategic arrangements. As Professor
P6rez-Sdinchez acknowledges, even American economic aid started
flowing by the early 1950's.4 9 Besides, Europe's economic recovery
also directly benefited Spain by furnishing it an expanding trading
market. The better argument, one that Professor P6rez-Sinchez
adopts, is that "more than an economic plan, 'autarky was a politi-
cal choice.' ,5 A very productive inquiry would be the extent to
which autarky was a building bloc to establish fascist corporatism,
whereby the state, capital, and labor are institutionally and hierar-
chically integrated in the name of unity, stability, and order.i
Professor P~rez-Sdinchez identifies foreign tourism, emigrant
remittance, and foreign investment as the driving forces behind
47. See, e.g., Nicos POULANTZAS, FASCISM AND DICTATORSHIP (1974); PERRY ANDERSON,
LINEAGES OF THE ABSOLUTIST STATE (1974).
48. SeeP6rez-Sdnchez, supra note 1, at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 949-52, 33 U. MICH.J.L.
REFORM at 365-68.
49. See id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 950,33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 366.
50. Id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 949, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at 365 (quoting RAY-
MOND CARR &JUAN P. AIZPURA, SPAIN: DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 52 (1979)).
51. For a useful introduction to corporatism, see HOWARD J. WIARDA, CORPORATISM
AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THE OTHER GREAT "ISM" (1997).
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Spain's economic recovery in the 1960s. 2 This is undisputed. Pro-
fessor P~rez-Sdnchez adopts the position advanced by Edward
Malefakis that the influx of tourism triggered changes in "sexual
mores," "social attitudes," "life-styles," and "uncensored sources of
information."5 3 While this certainly was one of the impacts of tour-
ism in Spain, when combined with other factors, one may identify
less gleaming phenomena left in the wake of global tourism. The
Caribbean, South Pacific, and Asian "tourist heavens," like Thailand,
are cases where burgeoning tourist industries led not to political lib-
eralization, but rather to distorted dependent economies and
degradation of the "natives" who "service" the tourists.
54
Professor P~rez-Sdinchez argues that the economic marginality
of Spain "in the sexist imaginary... must have been perceived as a
passive, feminized position,"55 and that it "must have weighed heav-
ily in the imaginary of the Francoist regime. 56 Here she deploys
the term "imaginary" in its psychoanalytic sense.57 While incorpora-
tion of interdisciplinary constructs in analysis of the law is
laudatory, some caution is warranted. When theoretical constructs
travel between disciplines, mistranslations and displacements are
common. This is even more likely when concepts designed to fa-
cilitate analysis of individual behavior are applied to collective
behavior, or the other way around. Without going into the career
of the Laconian construct of the imaginary, it appears that Profes-
sor Prez-Sinchez deploys it in the sense of the collective
imagination or self-conception of a political order. To put the
concept to such use, without doing violence to its original place in
psychoanalytic theory, one would have to reconceptualize it, as
Cornelius Castoriadis has done.8
52. See Prez-SAnchez, supra note 1, at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 950-51, 33 U. MIcH.J.L.
REFORM at 366-67.
53. Id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 951, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 367.
54. See, e.g., SEX, SUN AND GOLD: TOURISM AND SEX WORK IN THE CARIBBEAN
(Kamala Kempadoo ed., 1999).
55. Prez-Sainchez, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 952, 33 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM at 368.
56. Id at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 951, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 367.
57. Id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 951 n.29, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 367 n.29.
58. See CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS, THE IMAGINARY INSTITUTION OF SOCIETY (Kathleen
Blarney trans., Polity Press 1987). Laconian concept of the imaginary may be summed up as
sexual and culturally-specific images, symbols, metaphors, and representations that help
constitute various forms of subjectivity. SeeJacquline Rose, The Imaginary, in THE TALKING
CURE (Colin MacCabe ed., 1981); SUPPOSING THE SUBJECT (Joan Copjec ed., 1994). For
very useful deployments of psychoanalytical approaches to examine race, see THE PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS OF RACE (Christopher Lane ed., 1998).
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Professor Ptrez-Sinchez goes on to state, "[b]ecause the regime
was not as normative and central as it wanted itself to be perceived
as, the mere existence of non-heterosexual practices must have
threatened Francoist legitimacy to its core. 5 9 We would like to fur-
ther complicate the immediate connection Professor Prez-
Sdinchez draws between the representation of the Spanish state as
feminine and the targeting of homosexuals. Further research is in
order to explore the connection between feminization of a state
and the targeting of homosexuality. Questions that should be ad-
dressed include, how does the feminization of a state get altered
through the elimination of homosexuality? Also, why is homo-
sexuality singled out for legal regulation in these contexts and not
the whole spectrum of "non-normative sexual practices"? Sexually
transgressive practices can be perceived as threatening to a highly
regulated, fascist state. Yet even in contemporary liberal democra-
cies the struggle for equal rights by sexual minorities has been met
at times with opposition that takes the form of censorship, defense
of marriage, and social and cultural exclusion. 6° It may not be fas-
cist ideology per se that targets homosexuals. After all, this
ideology operates in tandem with a dominant sexual ideology that
remains fearful of practices that fall outside what is regarded as the
sexual norm.
The idea of sex and sexuality as a dangerous and corrupting
force, to be carefully contained at all costs within the family and
marriage, is hoary and has been reinforced with renewed vigor
since Victorian times.6 ' Today there exists a naturalized and uni-
versalized set of ideas about sex. The features of this dominant
understanding of sexuality have been explicated very well in the
work of Gayle Rubin. In her understanding, sex is a natural force
and is also sinful and dangerous.63 And sex is subjected to unduly
harsh penalties, unless it happens to occur within the slender
parameters of normative sexuality, which in its most pure form is
heterosexual, marital, monogamous, reproductive, and non-
commercial. Normative sexuality is accorded the maximum legal
59. Phrez-Sdnchez, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 952, 33 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM at 368.
60. See, e.g., Lise Gottell, The New Politics of Anti-Pornography, in BRENDA COSSMAN, ET
AL., BAD ATTITUDES ON TRIAL: PORNOGRAPHY, FEMINISM, AND THE BULTER DECISION 48
(1997).
61. Some argue that the very foundation of "civilization" is rooted in the control of
sexuality. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1929).
62. See Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in
PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267 (Carol Vance, ed., 1992).
63. See generally id.
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and social benefits, while practices that fall outside of this domi-
nant sexual ideology, such as sodomy or commercial sex work,
bear the greatest social and legal stigma.64 Border crossings be-
tween what is described as good sex and bad sex take place from
time to time; but the crossing of really 'bad' erotic practices into
moral and legal acceptability is feared and resisted.
65
Professor Pdrez-Sinchez focuses her arguments on the targeting
of homosexuals in Francoist Spain. We locate this argument within
a broader understanding of the relationship between sexual nor-
mativity and nation-state identity, which becomes particularly
intense at moments of political and social rupture. The criminali-
zation of homosexuality was not the work only of fascist states. We
believe that the elimination, incarceration, and/or rehabilitation
of the "deviant" sexual subject has been and continues to be inte-
gral to the operation of sexual normativity in the broader project
of the nation-state. Re-education, rehabilitation, and reintegration
are directed at reform into the mainstreams into dominant sexual
normativity more specifically, heteronormativity. 66 It is a strategy
that has been used frequently to deal with sexual difference. This
response has been and continues to be the dominant way in which
many contemporary states deal with sex workers and prostitution.
67
In the case of sex work, re-education involves learning the skills of
domesticity, rehabilitation involves stripping the worker (generally
female) of her whore identity, and re-integration involves the proc-
ess of converting her into a "good," socially acceptable woman. 6
Sexual normativity is integral to a nation-state's identity. Re-
integration or containment of 'deviant' sexual actors remains par-
ticularly acute at moments of profound social change and political
disorientation. As Jeffrey Weeks states,
[in] oral panic occurs in complex societies when deep rooted
and difficult to resolve issues become focused on symbolic
64. See INDIAN PEN. CODE 377 (1987); PAKISTAN PEN. CODE 377 (1985) (providing a
minimum penalty of ten years imprisonment for sodomy).
65. See Rubin, supra note 62, at 283.
66. See, e.g., Usha Ramanathan, Women, Law and Institutionalisation: A Manifestation of
State Power, 3 INDIANJ. OF GENDER STUDIES, 199 (1996).
67. See, e.g., GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION (Kamala
Kempadoo &Jo Doezema eds., 1998); GAIL PHETERSON, THE PROSTITUTION PRISM (1996);
Janie Chuang, Redirecting the Debate Over Trafficking in Women: Definitions, Paradigns, and
Context, 11 HARV. Hum. RTS. J. 65 (1998); Carol Smart, Unquestionably a Moral Issue: Rhetori-
cal Devices and Regulatory Imperatives, in CAROL SMART, LAW, CRIME AND SEXUALITY 88
(1995).
68. See Rubin, supra note 62.
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agents which can be easily targeted. Over the past century
sexuality has become a potent focus of such moral panics ...
Whilst the concept of moral panic does not explain why trans-
fers of anxiety like these occur-this has to be a matter of
historical analysis-it nevertheless offers a valuable framework
for describing the course of events.
69
The rise of right-wing politics, the decline in nuclear family forms,
and the globalization of national economies are all examples of
disruptions that have triggered social-purity movements and fears
that the sexual order will crumble and lead to social chaos. At such
moments of instability or transition, social anxieties focus on per-
sons or groups of people who are identified as threats to accepted
social norms and values.
III. CONTAINING THE HOMOSEXUAL 'CONTAGION'
Professor P~rez-Sdinchez focuses on the specific relationship be-
tween the new "queer law" and the containment of the
homosexual "contagion." As she points out, the 1970 Spanish law
against "dangerous social behavior" replicated in most ways an
older law enacted in 1954, which dealt with "thugs and vagrants,"
and permitted incarcerating the deviant subject.70 Professor Perez-
Sinchez states that an important addition in the new law was the
inclusion of provisions also directed towards "rehabilitating" and
"curing" the homosexual subject." She discusses the various provi-
sions of the law that related to homosexuals. It contained security
and incarceration measures as well as rehabilitative measures for
dealing with the homosexual. The security measures included con-
finement for four months to three years in a reeducation
institution and a provision prohibiting homosexuals from residing
in certain designated areas.7 2 In addition they were subjected to
State surveillance.73 It also established an entire institutional
69. JEFFREY WEEKS, AGAINST NATURE 118 (1991).
70. Prez-Sdinchez, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 964, 33 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM at 380.
71. Id. at 5 MlCH.J. RACE & L. at 970, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 386.
72. See id. at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 959, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at 375.
73. See id.
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apparatus directed at the social reform and rehabilitation of the
dangerous subject.74
Analyzing the Spanish legislation, which mandated that homo-
sexuals "be confined to special institutions and, at all costs, with
absolute separation from the rest,'' 71 Professor P6rez-Sfinchez ob-
serves that homosexuals were treated "[a]s if infected with a
contagious disease .... perceived as carrying a particularly infec-
tious brand of dangerousness." 6 She also quotes the 1970 law that
provided for "rehabilitation of the dangerous subject through the
most purified technique" 7 and notes its "blood-chilling connota-
tions."7 We believe this ensemble of notions of disease, infection,
contiguousness, danger, and purification furnishes an opening to
locate sexual repression and racism at the very heart of modernity
in general and nation-building in particular.
Modernity posits as universal ideas reason, autonomy, equality,
citizenship, representation, and the rule of law.79 Colonialism and
the age of empire, coterminous with modernity, however, brought
into sharp relief the exclusions built into these supposedly univer-
sal concepts. While Europe was developing ideas of political
freedom, particularly in France, Britain, and Holland, it simulta-
neously pursued and held vast empires where such freedoms were
either absent or severely attenuated for the majority of native in-
habitants.8 0 Liberalism, and the rights and freedoms that it
nurtured, co-existed with the Empire.8 I There were at least two
ways in which to reconcile the freedoms associated with liberalism
with notions of the Empire. This reconciliation included linking
the capacity to reason with adherence to some notion of a univer-
sal natural law, applicable to all. 2 These universally applicable
74. See id. at 5 MIcH.J. RACE& L. at 966,33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 382.
75. Id. at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 964 n.85, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 380 n.85.
76. Id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 965, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at 381.
77. Id. at 5 MICH. J. RAcE & L. at 966, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at 382.
78. Id.
79. SeeANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY (1990).
80. See generally UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT (1999).
81. See generally id.
82. Francisco De Vitoria, a Sixteenth Century Spanish jurist, used this postulation of
reason and the existence of a universal natural law to argue that the Indian was entitled to
the same rights as other men. Any interference with the exercise of such rights, whether by
the Spanish or the Indian, could justify retaliation. Moreover, as Indians were endowed with
reason, they were also capable of changing their peculiar practices and adhering to univer-
sal norms. If they refused to change, this could also justify sanctions and intervention. See
generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).
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norms were premised on European practices, to which the colonial
subjects had to conform if they were to avoid sanctions and achieve
full membership.
A second way in which to reconcile colonial domination with
ideals of freedom and equality was through the discourse of differ-
ence, whereby the eligibility and capacity for freedom and
progress were deemed biologically determined, and colonial sub-
jugation was legitimized as the natural subordination of lesser
83
races to higher ones. The purportedly universal rights of man
could be denied to those not considered to be men or human.
Liberal discourses of rights, inclusion, and equality could be rec-
onciled with colonial policies of exclusion and discrimination only
by presuming differences between different types of individuals.
To lay a claim to modernity a discourse must include capacities it
identifies with human nature-inherent freedom, equality and ra-
tionality. This anthropological premise anchors the concept of
consent, which in turn is the foundation of institutions of contract,
rule of law, and representation. 4 Those designated as being unable
to exercise reason are deemed incapable of consent, and thus can
be excluded from political constituency and governed without
consent. The capacity to reason, far from being universal, was pos-
ited to be a matter of education and "breeding," whereby one is
initiated into a time, place, and social norm, with the White, male,
heterosexual, propertied adult furnishing the standard s.8 5 Simulta-
neously, the emphasis on difference, by constructing the Other as
unfathomable, and inscrutable, as distant and removed, was partly
achieved by demonstrating that the "other" was civilizationally
backward or infantile. 6 Colonial subjugation was one way in which
to rectify the deficiencies of the past-what has frequently been
described as the civilizing mission of empire, in societies that pur-
portedly were stagnant and mired in the chokehold of custom.
Colonialism was posited as "an engine that tows societies stalled in
their past into contemporary time and history."8 7 Achievement of
83. See Tayyab Mahmud, Colonialism and Modern Constructions of Race: A Preliminary In-
quiry, 53 MIAMI L. REV. 1219 (1999).
84. SeeJoHN GRAY, LIBERALISM (2nd ed. 1995).
85. See, e.g.,JOHN LOCKE, THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION (1880); MEHTA, supra
note 80; Tayyab Mahmud, Race, Reason & Representation, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1581 (2000).
86. For nuanced expositions of a foundational project of modernity, namely the con-
stLruction of non-Europeans as the "others" of Europe, and how this construction anchors
the identity of modern Europe, see PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW
(1993);JOHANNES FABIAN, TIME AND ITS OTHER: How ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS OBJECTS
(1983); ROBERT YOUNG, WHITE MYTHOLOGIES: WRITING HISTORY AND THE WEST (1990).
87. MEHTA, supra note 80, at 82.
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this version of civilization was regarded as a necessary pre-
condition for progress, and the stage of civilization was the marker
to determine whether progressive possibilities were in reach of a
given community at any point of time.
The universal claims of liberalism were able to justify political
exclusions, and this logic continues to operate in the post-colonial
moment. It serves as a basis for distinguishing Others, whether
they be women, gays and lesbians, or ethnic and religious minori-
ties. When confronted with difference, liberalism spawns strategies
of exclusion based on class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, religion,
and race.
Universality is always accompanied by, and indeed rests on, what
Denise da Silva evocatively terms "the other side of universality.,
8
This "moral and legal no man's land, where universality finds its
physical limit,"89 is built upon the foundation of difference. The
Enlightenment project, which claims universality, could relate to
those excluded from the project by positing them as qualitatively
different and not quite human. The very identity of modern
Europe was then constituted by differentiating it from this not-
quite-human Other. It is this identity rooted in a posited essential
difference, particularly with the figure of the dark-skinned savage,
that furnished the grounds to constitute the White, civilized, disci-
plined European; in other words, the universal subject. In this
sense, then, we can say with Peter Fitzpatrick that race produces
universality.90
When the Spanish law considers homosexuals as diseased, con-
tagious, dangerous, and warranting purification, it situates them in
this dark side of universality. By this gesture the Spanish law raced
the homosexual. By racing we mean the technology of power
whereby domination is exercised and legitimated on grounds of
the professed biological, natural, and immutable deficiencies of
the subordinated. Conventional understanding posits race as a pre-
conceptual, pre-political signifier. This understanding ignores the
fact that race as we know it today is a modern category, which
shares in the distinctive features of modern power: that as a strat-
egy of power/knowledge, race produces modern subjects available
for appropriation into modern narratives of being. As Da Silva has
88. Denise Frerreire da Silva, Interrogating the Socio-Logos ofJustice: Considerations
of Race Beyond the Logic of Exclusion, 1 (paper presented at 2000 Summer Institute of the
Law and Society Association) (manuscript on file with authors).
89. Id. at 2.
90. See Peter Fitzpatrick, Racism and the Innocence of Law, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
119 (Peter Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt eds., 1990).
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demonstrated, by furnishing the connection between history and
science, the temporal and spatial, nation and the modern subject,
race emerges as a global category to define the territory of moder-
nity and thus to configure the modern global space.91 Modern
power and knowledge constituted race as a category that connects
body, place of origin, and consciousness. We designate racing as
the modern power and knowledge maneuver to connect the body
with consciousness in order to create a subject available for subjec-
tion and marginalizing. It is not essential that racing anchor the
connection between the body and the mind in the color of the
skin. Any production of a subjected being that rests on any attrib-
ute of the body, then, can be seen as racing.
To appreciate the concept of racing, it may be helpful to refer to
Foucault's concept of "bio-power" as a link between microphysics
and macrophysics of power.9 2 Bio-power, for Foucault, designates
forms of power exercised over persons specifically to the extent
that they are thought of as living beings: a politics concerned with
subjects as members of a population, in which issues of individual
sexual and reproductive conduct interconnect with issues of na-
tional policy. This is in line with Foucault's position that modernity
renders life a discrete object of perception and regulation, both
protected and eliminated by operations of power. 93 Examination
and designation of the body is indispensable for its regulation by
and subjection to power. It is to bring into sharper relief this in-
terdependency between designation and subjection, that Foucault,
instead of speaking about the law, speaks of a "scientifica-legal
complex" or of a "epistemologoco-juridical formation."9 4 In a simi-
lar vein Giorgio Agamben holds that "the production of a
biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.
95
Racing shares with bio-politics the feature of making the body
available as the site of inscription of modern power. Racing, how-
ever, is a maneuver whereby as the body is made available to power
it is already placed outside the zone of normalcy on grounds of
some posited biological feature. The raced body comes to have a
particular location in the population: a part that is yet apart.
91. See Denise Ferreira da Silva, Race & Nation in the Mapping of the Modern Global
Space: A Critiqe of Sociology of Race Relations (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pittsburgh) (on file with authors).
92. MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 1 (1981).
93. See id. at 143.
94. Michel Foucault, Governmentality, 6 1 & C 5, 23 (1979).
95. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, Homo SACAR: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 6 (Daniel
Heller-Roazen trans., 1998).
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
432 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 33:3
Racing, then, is a power and knowledge technology of the insertion
of a body into the population in a subordinate position with the
subordination attributed to essential and pre-conceptual deficien-
cies.
The Spanish anti-homosexual legal regime, with its attendant
material and discursive structures, teaches us that if we want to see
racism, we should look for racing, not race. Those engaged in the
critical project of anti-essentialism and anti-subordination would
do well to remember this.
Modernity has also seen the consolidation of History-the
unilinear, progressive Eurocentric, teleological history-as the
dominant mode of experiencing time and being.96 In History, time
overcomes space-a process whereby the distant Other is supposed
to, in time, become like oneself; Europe's present becomes the fu-
ture for all Others. Embodying the agenda of modernity, History
constitutes a closure that destroys or domesticates the Other. His-
tory, as a mode of being, becomes the condition that makes
modernity possible, with the nation-state posited as the subject of
History that will realize modernity.
The very birth of nationalism was "coeval with the birth of uni-
versal history. 9 7 But the nation, an anomaly in the age of
universality, is Janus-faced: it claims to be universal, unbound, and
uncontained, but in order to exist and be stable, that same nation
must situate itself in particular spaces. The ground of the nation is
homogeneity of population within a bounded territory. It is not
surprising, then, that the process of nation-building is a process of
exclusion; coherence is sought in a nation through the exclusion
of what is "Other" to it. In the final analysis, production of the
Other is raced: purportedly biological, immutable differences, an-
chored in blood, are posited as the natural markers of lines of
exclusion." Membership in the nation-citizenship--entitles one
to representation and protections of the law. A quick route to de-
nial of representation and protection, then, is denial or revocation
of citizenship-excision from the body of the nation. The Spanish
law constituted homosexuals as diseased and dangerous, warranting
96. See generally ROBERT YOUNG, WHITE MYTHOLOGIES: WRITING HISTORY AND THE
WEST (1990).
97. PARTHA CHAirERJEE, NATIONALIST THOUGHT AND THE COLONIAL WORLD: A DE-
RIVATIVE DISCOURSE? 2 (1986).
98. See generally ETIENNE BALIBAR & IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, RACE, NATION, CLASS:
AMBIGUOUS IDENTITIES (1991); PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW
(1992); Peter Fitzpatrick, 'We Know What it is When You Do Not Ask Us'. Nationalism as Racism,
in NATIONALISM, RACISM AND THE RULE OF LAW (Peter Fitzpatrick ed., 1995).
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purification. Through this construction, it rehearsed the classical
nation-building gesture. Spain constituted the Other in a discourse
of blood and body, facilitating exclusion from the politically fran-
chised body of the nation. The modern Spanish nation was
inaugurated by the expulsion of the Moors and the Jews in 1492;
the raced homosexual becomes the Moor or the Jew of Franco's
Spain. Again, it is racing, not race, that constitutes racism.
It is intriguing to note that there is no direct reference to lesbi-
anism in the legal and cultural complex examined by Professor
P6rez-Sdinchez, although she does state that lesbians were assumed
to be included in the 1970 law.99 The absence of any reference to
lesbianism, according to Professor Pdrez-Sdnchez was due to the
fact that in "a highly machista society, where only men and hetero-
sexuality are valorized and where women are trained to be passive,
compliant, subservient mothers, women's independent sexuality
was difficult to conceptualize. '" '0 This position warrants further ex-
ploration. Purportedly, in a "highly machista," heterosexual context,
the feminized, submissive, gay man would also be difficult to con-
ceptualize. Yet he was precisely the one targeted by the state as a
security risk. In fact, it is quite likely that there were also laws that
targeted prostitution, which would provide evidence that in fact
the state and legislators were aware of and fully comprehended the
existence of female sexual autonomy. Could the absence of lesbi-
anism have more to do with the absence of women from the public
and political arena, whether as resisters or even as perpetrators?
Professor Prez-Sinchez's comments also raise a second issue
that is perhaps more relevant to the contemporary moment. If les-
bianism or female sexual autonomy was incomprehensible to the
legislators, and presumably to both gay and straight men, it leads
us to question political strategies that suture gay and lesbian sexu-
ality together. The comparison between gay and straight men
along the spectrum of "machista" culture has little relevance to
either the straight woman or lesbian woman. There are also a
whole range of sexual practices that are illicit and stigmatize
women that may be permissible for men, or at least, not invite
stigma, depending, of course, on the class and race of the male.
These include extramarital sex, oral and anal sex with women, sex
before marriage, sex outside of marriage, sex as a divorced or wid-
owed man, and sex for money. The legal, cultural, and moral
99. SeeP~rez-Sdinchez, supra note 1, at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 969-70, 33 U. MICH.J.L.
REFORM at 385-86.
100. Id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 969, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORm at 385.
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stigma against women who participate in these practices is far
heavier than that placed on men. Professor P~rez-Sfinchez's article
in many ways illustrates what happens to lesbian sexuality when it is
considered in tandem with gay sexuality-it remains largely unad-
dressed and invisible. The broader political battles continue to.
operate predominantly along the gay and straight male dichotomy,
which leaves female sexuality unexplored and uninterrogated.
IV. LIBERATION, POPULAR CULTURE AND THE
SUBVERSIVE SEXUAL SUBJECT
In the final section of her article, Professor P6rez-Sdinchez exam-
ines the flurry of writing and activism on the subject of
homosexuality that was triggered by the 1970 law, which continued
until its derogation in 1978.10' She then discusses the cultural and
sexual changes that took place with the stabilization of democracy
in the 1980's. She looks specifically at how sexual identity came to
be foregrounded in popular culture. Professor P6rez-Sinchez fo-
cuses on the short story of Eduardo Mendicutti entitled Una mala
noche la tiene cualquiera [Anyone Can Have a Bad Night] .2 The
story is told from the perspective of la Madelon, the main protago-
nist, a hormone taking transgender. La Madelon reflects on what
might have happened had Antonio Tejero's failed coup attempt in
February 1983 been successful, and reversed the delicate process
of democracy that had begun after the death of Franco in 1975.
The story is a fictionalized account of the consequences a queer
could have encountered had democracy failed. In highlighting the
identity of a transgendered person and making it a critical part of
the narrative about the future of Spain's democracy, the author
brings marginalized members of society onto the center stage of
modern Spanish history. Professor P6rez-Sfinchez reads the novel
as one in which the "queer" is a "responsible, democracy-loving
citizen," whose interest in democracy does not reside in the sexual
license and liberty it will accord her.0 3 La Madelon's interest is
aligned with her commitment to the political causes of women,
sexual minorities, and the working class, and it is informed by the
experiences of persecution she suffered as a working-class, Andalu-
101. Seeid. at5 MICH.J. RAcE& L. at971,33 U. Micn.J.L. REFORM at387.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 5 MIGH.J. RACE & L. at 974, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 390.
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sian gay man under the fascist regime. She expresses her fears on
the night the coup takes place-the loss of liberty and sexual iden-
tity she would experience and the possibility that she would have
to return to a life incognito. The story represents an overpowering
fear and a powerful denunciation by Mendicutti of sexual oppres-
sion, a vindication of gender and sexual freedom, and a validation
of the "truly democratic respect of differences by counterpointing
the gains of democracy with the potential losses of queers that a
return to a Francoist-style dictatorship would bring.',
10 4
The uniqueness of the novel lies in the fact that the narrator is a
sexual other as well as the fact that through this protagonist's hid-
den history, the netherworld of gay life is brought to the surface
through the telling of this story. 0 5 The novel is representative of a
shift that took place in the cultural expression of the 1980's that
rejected the meta-narratives of nation and democracy that were
promoted by the leftist resistance to Franco. '°6 Instead, there was a
de-centering of the main narrative and an embracing of post-
modernism in the cultural effusion that subsequently developed,
mostly through the work of young, underground marginal minori-
ties who were not contracted into any kind of intellectual
compromise prior to the death of Franco. This movement is sym-
bolized in the work of the celebrated filmaker Pedro Almodovar' °7
They constituted a movement called la movida madrilefia [the Ma-
drilenian movement], which represented a collapse of the elitist
distinction between high culture and low culture."" The disparag-
ing response of those who constituted the core of the leftist
resistance to Franco's regime to la movida reflects an inability to
deal with popular culture and a frank discussion of sexuality and
sexual identity as a serious political topic.' °9 But for Professor P-
rez-Sdinchez, this cultural explosion is a method for attributing gays
and lesbians with agency, given that they are forgotten minorities.
This attainment of agency is partly accomplished through retrieving
literature to help assess the cultural and psychological legacy of the
struggles over insubordinate sexual practices. What Professor
104. Id. at 5 Mci.J. RACE & L. at 976, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 392.
105. See id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 972-73, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 388--89.
106. SeePrez-Sdinchez, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. ,at 978, 33 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM at 394 (summarizing the position of 'underground, marginal minorities' as dis-




109. See id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE& L. at 978-79, 33 U. MmCH..J.L. REFORM at 394-95.
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P6rez-Sdinchez's article brings out is that attempts at controlling
sexual conduct cannot be viewed exclusively in terms of the re-
pressive impact. Beyond repression, resistance in the Foucauldian
sense must be examined, such as was demonstrated by the surge in
gay-rights activism that resulted after the enactment of the law.
This last section of Professor P6rez-Sdinchez's article is the most
powerful in its analysis of the role of popular culture as an impor-
tant political and subversive space.1  The analysis of the
relationship of popular culture to the past as represented by
Franco's regime, and the possibilities open to marginalized groups
in the newly emerging democracy, is the most engaging part of the
article. The role of popular culture has been a critical space of
subversion and expression, particularly in repressive environments.
The cross-dressed woman in Chinese and Japanese stage traditions,
where the transvestite figure creates a crisis in gender categoriza-
tion,"' or the daring song and dance sequences in Hindi
commercial cinema that challenges both cultural and sexual nor-
mativity in an increasingly reactionary political and cultural
environment, keep the possibilities of a subversive politics and lib-
eration of the sexual subject alive. Most of the references to popular
culture and the cultural explosion in the article, however, are to
works that emerged after democracy had been established. There
is little that is said about the cultural resistance that took place dur-
ing the period between 1970-78. What was going on during this
period of the Franco repression? What was the "flurry of writing"
that took place then?
The discussion about the literary and cultural explosion that
took place in the 1980's represent not only the unleashing of sub-
altern sexual identities into the public arena, but also the
importance of parody and performance as a form of expression for
sexual sub-groups and other marginalized subjects. Popular cul-
ture provides an alternative site of resistance and is a vital force,
especially in non-democratic repressive regimes, where the spaces
of resistance in the legal domain become stilted and non-dynamic.
Even in democratic regimes, popular culture provides an impor-
tant arena for resistance to neo-conservative and nationalist forces.
In the United States, for example, films such as Dogma (which
poses a critical challenge to religion made by fallen angels who are
110. See, e.g., HENRY A. GIROUx, DISTURBING PLEASURES: LEARNING POPULAR CULTURE
(1994).
111. See Majorie Garber, The Occidental Tourist: M.Butterfly and the Scandal of Transves-
tism, in NATIONALISMS AND SEXUALITIES 121-46 (Andrew Parker et al., eds., 1992).
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aiming to find a way back into heaven) challenge the over-inflated
influence of the Christian Right on cultural and political life. At a
time when right- wing forces are bent on opposing the extension
of hate crimes legislation to cover sexual orientation, the celluloid
representation of Teena Brandon, the transgendered teenager
from Nebraska, in Boys Don't Cry, becomes a vital expression of the
violence and brutality that sexual minorities experience as a result
of unfettered hatred.
In the 1991 film Paris is Burning, Jeenie Livingston documents
the challenge posed by miming at transvestite balls in Harlem. The
film looks at how the young gay men of Harlem, who created
"voguing," turned these stylized dance competitions into dazzling
expressions of personal pride. Through their constant re-enactment
of high fashion, sexual normativity, and status, they challenge the
stability of gender categories and dominant culture."
2
By way of comparison, Indian commercial cinema has pro-
vided popular and subversive spaces within post-colonial South
Asia, South-East Asia, and the Middle East, as well as in the Asian
diaspora. The sexualised song and dance sequences have been of
particular relevance to women in a cultural context where sexual
expression is highly curtailed and restricted. Even the legal chal-
lenges to these sequences involve a contest between the hegemonic
and counter-hegemonic representations of sexuality, what con-
stitutes culture, and the limits of censorship and free speech.1
3
The new generation of film heroines are now "vamping" it out
on screen, occupying the dominant narrative, prompting the
possibility of a re-signification and re-reading of the script by the
spectator. II4 The recuperation of the agency of sexually stigmatized
communities through popular culture places the activity beyond the
charge that such cultural products are simply hedonistic. Such works
challenge hegemonic definitions of the "political" and assist in de-
centering the authority of law.
112. For a more detailed discussion of this film, see Judith Butler, Gender is Burning:
Questions of Appropriation and Subversion, in BODIES THAT MATrER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIM-
ITS OF SEX 121-42 (1993).
113. See Ratna Kapur, Post-colonial Erotic Disruptions: Legal Narratives of Culture, Sex and
Nation in India, 9 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2000) (on file with authors).
114. See Shohini Ghosh, The Troubled Existence of Sex and Sexuality: Feminists Engage with
Censorship, in IMAGE JOURNEYS: AUDIO-VISUAL MEDIA & CULTURAL CHANGE IN INDIA 233-
260 (Christiane Brosius & Melissa Butcher eds., 1999); Shohini Ghosh, Deviant Pleasures and
Disorderly Women: The Representation of the Female Outlaw in Bandit Queen and Anjaam, in FEMI-
NIST TERRAINS IN LEGAL DOMAINS: INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS ON WOMEN AND LAW IN
INDIA 150-83 (Ratna Kapur ed., 1996).
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Professor Pdrez-Sinchez's discussion also raises important ques-
tions regarding difference and the ultimate goal of la movida. For
Professor Prez-Sdinchez the role of the transvestite in Mendu-
cutti's novel is symbolic of the right to be different and the goal of
Spanish democracy to accept and live with difference so that the
traumas of the past are not repeated. But what does the right to be
different entail in a democracy? How is it to be accommodated
within the egalitarian objectives of a democracy? And by recogniz-
ing the right to be different, do we not end up re-creating the
difference and reinforcing the prejudices, stigmas, and other social
pejoratives that are associated with that same difference?
A broader question about difference is whether the objective of
a subordinated sub-group is merely one of resistance and then as-
similation once the process of democracy is achieved. What is the
statement, 'Your humble servant is thus: an independent, liber-
ated, modern woman. And more of a democrat than anybody
else," intended to convey?' What is the ultimate aspiration of the
"queer nation"? Is it to assimilate or to disrupt? Or is there a third
possibility, to disrupt through the process of assimilation-that is,
by occupying the norm, may the queer destabilize and reconfigure
the norm?
In the United States, queers have lobbied for the right to
marry," 6 and as well as for parental rights, in order to be treated
the same as heterosexual couples. Is engagement with such issues
truly liberating for the sexual subaltern subject? And does such
engagement modify these structures and institutions in a way that
115. Prez-Sinchez, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & LAw at 975, 33 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM at 391.
116. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). The case emerged from an appeal
by three same-sex couples to the Supreme Court of Vermont after a lower court dismissed
their case in 1997, holding that the discrimination in the marriage law against same-sex
marriage was not "invalid." The lower court held that there was one surviving rationale for
denying lesbian and gay couples the freedom-to-marry-they could not procreate and mar-
riage ensures procreation. This holding was rejected by the Vermont Supreme Court. There
were two considerations to be made by the Court: Whether the existing marriage laws were
only applicable to heterosexual couples? The Court held they were. And secondly, whether
such exclusion rendered the marriage laws unconstitutional? The Court did not go so far as
to hold that the marriage laws were unconstitutional. Instead, it acknowledged that the
plaintiffs were entitled to all the benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to mar-
ried opposite-sex couples. The Court directed the legislature to decide how to achieve that
equality in a "reasonable" period of time. The Court did not address the question whether it
would be constitutional for the legislature to opt for a "separate but equal" approach, by
withholding marriage licenses to same-sex couples while granting the rights, benefits, and
responsibilities that accompany such licenses.
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does not reinforce dominant social and sexual norms, but rather
transforms those institutions?
V. SUBALTERN RESISTANCE
Professor P6rez-Sdinchez captures well the resistance by sexual
minorities to anti-queer legal and ideological strategies. Her analy-
sis of the unified Spanish penal code of 1822, and the subsequent
changes prompted by shifts in the political and cultural mores is
very useful. It demonstrates that the law itself, even when incorpo-
rated into codes, is always a contested site. Law always lies along
the fault lines between operations of power and practices of resis-
tance. Exploring this dynamic nature of the law and the centrality
of subalterns' resistance in this dynamic must be a primary agenda
of critical legal scholarship.
A critical question is to explore the sources of subaltern resis-
tance. It cannot emanate only from identity politics, which can
reify the subject location of the subaltern. An example of this is the
manner in which words intended to insult gay men and women,
such as "fruit", "dyke," and "fag," have been appropriated by the
gay community as words denoting pride, self-awareness, and self-
acceptance. Identity is generally understood as self-perception and
expression based on structures of affinity and processes of affilia-
tion. In other words, when a person identifies herself as
homosexual or heterosexual, Black or Brown, progressive or reac-
tionary, her assumption and expression of any identity involves
agency and choice on her part.
The terrain where agency is realized is not limitless, however.
Technologies of power define the territories where individuals may
assume their chosen identity. The apparent free choice of an iden-
tity is thus always already saturated with related contextual
conventions. It may be useful, therefore, to locate identity forma-
tion along the fault lines of effects of power and modes of
resistance, with identity always partaking of both. The project of
progressive transformative politics demands that when engaged in
strategic assertion of any identity, we accentuate and develop those
facets of the identity that augment resistance and contain and im-
pede the facets that are in symphony with technologies of power.
Only fidelity to this guideline ensures that assumption and
assertions of subaltern sexual identities remain in step with the
struggle for peace, justice, and dignity.
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We continue the turn toward complicating the subject by chal-
lenging liberalism's notion of a free and autonomous agent. As
Professor P~rez-Sfinchez's recounting of resistance demonstrates,
we must not reduce the subject to be a mere property and effect of
discourse or to equate consciousness with hegemony. We must not
posit hegemony as an order that cannot be escaped. Yet we cannot
bypass the subject of hegemony, as such avoidance precludes a re-
alistic analysis of freedom. Such a conceptual straight-jacket leads
to the impasse of, "[C] an the subaltern speak?""' 7 How may we ar-
ticulate concepts of freedom and subjectivity in a way that does not
take the form of a recovery of the authentic self?"'
Rajeswari Sunder Rajan has attempted to break through this
impasse in the context of debates about the sati and the free
will/coercion dichotomy." 9 Some feminists have argued that sati is
a coercive practice and that women who commit sati are victims,
while those who support sati contend that it is a voluntary act and
that the woman who undergoes it feels no pain. 20 Sunder Rajan,
drawing on the work of Elaine Scarry and her focus on the "radical
subjectivity of pain," argues that the focus on the pain of the dying
woman reminds us of the woman's subjectivity, as well as the fact
that the pain impels the suffering subject towards freedom.12 ' Her
reformulation avoids the complete erasure of the woman's subjec-
tivity through her experience of pain, while at the same time
117. GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL POLI-
TICS 197 (1988).
118. Michel Foucault engaged these questions in some of his later work, where he ad-
dressed the intimate relationship between modem technologies of power and the belief in
authenticity. See Truth, Power, Self" An Interview with Michel Foucault, in TECHNOLOGIES OF THE
SELF 10 (Luther H. Martin et al., eds., 1988).
119. Keeping in view the need to assess the practice of sati in context, we use the Ox-
ford English Dictionary's definition of sati provided by Sunder Rajan. This states that sati is
both a practice where "the Hindu widow... immolates herself on the funeral pile with her
husband's body" and "the immolation of a Hindu widow in this way." RAJESWARI SUNDER
RAJAN, REAL OR IMAGINED WOMEN: POSTCOLONIALISM, GENDER AND CULTURE 35 (1995).
Sati is thus referred to both in relation to the burning of the woman as well as the woman
who bums, that is, the widow is both the subject as well as the object of the sati. See id. For an
important discussion about the historic problematic representation of the practice of sati,
particularly in Western feminist texts, see Uma Narayan, Restoring History and Politics to
"Third-World Traditions": Contrasting the Colonialist Stance and Contemporary Contestations of Sati,
in DISLOCATING CULTURES: IDENTITITES, TRADITIONS, AND THIRD-WORLD-FEMINISM, 41-80
(1997).
120. See Madhu Kishwar & Vanita, The Burning of Roop Kanwar, 42 MANUSHI 25 (Sept.-
Dec. 1987); Sujata Patel & Kriswhna Kumar, Defenders of Sati, 23 ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL WEEKLY 129 (Jan. 1988); Julie Stephens, Feminist Fictions: A Critique of Femi-
nist Studies of Third World Women, with Special Reference to India (presented at the
Second Subaltern Sudies Conference in Calcutta, Jan. 1986) (on file with authors).
121. Stephens, supra note 120, at 2.
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recognizes that the experience of pain actuates the woman's desire
to escape from it, to be free from it. 122
Lata Mani also concedes that there is no such thing as voluntary
sati but tries to avoid the traps of the position that leads to the
complete erasure of the woman as a speaking subject.2 3 Rather
than ask the question, "can the subaltern speak?," Mani rephrases
the query by posing a series of questions, such as, Which groups
constitute the subaltern in any text? What is their relationship to
each other? How can they be heard to be speaking or not speaking
in a given set of materials? With what effect? 24 Altering the ques-
tions in this way enables us to retain the insight regarding the
positioning of the subject, which in the context of sati is the
woman in colonial discourse, and, in the context of Professor P&
rez-Sinchez's essay, is the homosexual who exists within the
discursive space of Franco's fascism. Such a strategy refuses to con-
cede to colonial discourse something that it did not achieve-the
erasure of women-or to the Franco regime the annihilation of
the homosexual through the law against dangerous social behav-
ior.
In our search for the sources of subaltern resistance, we may
find useful Gramsci's model of a fragmented composite subject
that is constituted as an "inventory of traces" of multiple and frag-
mented hegemonies. 25 A similar becoming point of departure is to
imagine a desiring subject who avoids becoming fully determined
by the symbolic order because there is always a surplus of the sub-
ject's "real" substance over any symbolization. 26 The focus of these
models is on the ongoing tension between specific structures of
domination and desires that escape hegemonic formations and
bear the seeds of change.1
7
It is along the fault lines between domination and desire that
"the individual repeatedly passes from language to language."28
Within this framework, one may analogize a sexual subaltern
subject to an agency that operates on multiple fronts, as the indi-
122. See RAJAN, supra note 119, at 35.
123. See Lata Mani, Cultural Theory, Colonial Texts: Reading Eyewitness Accounts of Widow
Burning, in CULTURAL STUDIES 403 (Lawrence Graossberg et al., eds., 1992).
124. See LATA MANI, CONTENTIOUS TRADITIONS: THE DEBATE ON SATI IN COLONIAL IN-
DIA 190 (1998).
125. GRAMSCI, supra note 17, at 324.
126. See SLAvoj ZIZEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 3 (1989).
127. See generally GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATrARI, ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM AND
SCHIZOPHRENIA (Robert Hurley et al. trans., 1983).
128. GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATTARI, A THOUSAND PLATEAUS: CAPITALISM AND
SCHIZOPHRENIA 94 (Brian Massumi trans., 1987).
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vidual is him or herself a site of conflicting desires and subjective
modalities.19 Beneath the dominant technologies of modernity
there may well survive a "'polytheism of scattered practices' ...
dominated but not erased by the triumphal success of one of
their number."' 3' It is in this context that we should turn to a
jurisprudence of reconstruction,' 3' and counter-hegemonic
"stories from the bottom."3 2 Nothing less than to stage an
"insurrection of subjugated knowledges,' ' 3 will suffice as a
strategy to "bring hegemonic historiography to crisis." 134 Intro-
ducing law to the life beneath things as presented by the social
order provides the best countervailing force to hegemony.
Edward Said, who alerted us to the constitutive and dominating
power of Orientalism, also reminds us that "in human history there
is always something beyond the reach of dominating systems, no
matter how deeply they saturate society, and this is obviously what
makes change possible." 3 5 Even as dictatorships cross-dress as de-
mocracies, critical scholars must aim to identify, explore and
expand spaces for resistance in the midst of the teeth-gritting har-
mony that exists between hegemony and coercion.
129. SeeKapur, supra note 113.
130. MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE 48 (Steven Rendall trans.,
1984).
131. Angela Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL L. REV. 741, 743
(1994).
132. Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
133. THOMAS KEENAN, FABLES OF RESPONSIBILITY: ABBERATIONS AND PREDICAMENTS
INETHICS AND POLITICS 140 (1997) (quoting Michel Foucault).
134. SPIVAR, IN OTHER WORLDS, supra note 117, at 198.
135. EDWARD SAID, THE WORLD, THE TEXT AND THE CRITIC 246-47 (1983).
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